Thursday, February 11, 2021

4 new decisions today by the SD Supreme Court

 

Introductory Comments:  Today the SD Supreme Court released 4 decisions. Three of these appeals were submitted more than 15 months ago.  The issues in each case are fairly complex, not subject to brief summaries.  One of the decisions represents a significant split among the views of the Justices.

 

The SD Supreme Court handed down four decisions this morning:

 

  1. Tilting at windmills in Duel County;

 

  1. Destruction of property by law enforcement (split decision);

 

  1. Property tax on 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation;

 

  1. Mechanic’s lien in Lawrence County

 

Summaries follows:

 

HOLBORN v. DEUEL CNTY. BD. OF ADJUSTMENT, 2021 S.D. 6:  This case, involving proposed windmills in Duel County, was orally argued November 4, 2019, over 15 months ago.  The dispute and its resolution before this appeal is described in ¶1 of the opinion:

 

[¶1.] Deuel Harvest Wind Energy, LLC and Deuel Harvest Wind Energy South, LLC (Deuel Harvest) applied for special exception permits (SEP) from the Deuel County Board of Adjustment (Board) to develop two wind energy systems (WES) in Deuel County. Several residents of Deuel County and neighboring counties (Appellees) objected. Following a public hearing, the Board unanimously approved the permits. Appellees petitioned the circuit court for writ of certiorari challenging the SEPs, including a claim that several members of the Board had interests or biases which disqualified them from considering the SEPs. The circuit court determined that two Board members had disqualifying interests and invalidated their votes. The court then reversed the decision of the Board granting the SEPs. Deuel Harvest appeals.

 

The result on appeal is set forth in the concluding paragraph of the opinion:

 

[¶54.] We affirm in part and reverse in part. We affirm the circuit court’s determination that Kanengieter and Brandt did not have a disqualifying interest under the Due Process Clause or applicable South Dakota statutes. We also affirm the circuit court’s determination that the Board regularly pursued its authority when it defined the term “business” in the Ordnance. However, the circuit court erred by invalidating the votes of DeBoer and Dahl. We reverse the court’s decision overturning the Board’s unanimous vote approving the SEPs and reinstate the Board’s decision granting the SEPs.

 

This decision is unanimous (5-0) with opinion authored by Chief Justice Jensen. 

 

HAMEN v. HAMLIN CNTY., 2021 S.D. 7:  This case, involving the destruction of property by law enforcement personnel, was orally argued September 30, 2019, over 16 months ago.  The dispute, as resolved at both the trial level and on this appeal is set forth in the opening paragraph of the Court’s opinion:

 

[¶1.] Gareth and Sharla Hamen (the Hamens) filed a complaint against Hamlin County (the County), the Hamlin County Sheriff Chad Schlotterbeck (the Sheriff), and other John Doe deputies after the Hamens’ mobile home was damaged during the arrest of their son, Gary Hamen. The Hamens sought compensation for inverse condemnation and stated a separate claim for deprivation of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the County, dismissing the claims without prejudice, but denied the other motions. We granted the petition for discretionary appeal filed by the County and the Sheriff. We reverse the circuit court’s denial of summary judgment on the inverse condemnation claim. We affirm in part and reverse in part the circuit court’s denial of summary judgment on the § 1983 claim.

 

The precise ruling on appeal is set forth in the concluding paragraph of the Court’s opinion:

 

[¶56.] We reverse the circuit court’s denial of summary judgment on the inverse condemnation claim and direct the entry of summary judgment dismissing this claim with prejudice as to the Sheriff and the County. On the Hamens’ § 1983 claims, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of summary judgment on the Sheriff’s qualified immunity for the unlawful entry claim, but we reverse the circuit court’s denial of summary judgment on the Sheriff’s qualified immunity on the excessive force claim. We remand the § 1983 claim against the Sheriff for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 

The Court’s opinion is authored by Chief Justice Jensen.  It is not unanimous.  The alignment of the views of the Justices on this case is as follows:

 

[¶57.] KERN, SALTER, and DEVANEY, Justices, and GILBERTSON, Retired Chief Justice, concur on Issue 1.

[¶58.] KERN, SALTER, and DEVANEY, Justices, concur on Issue  2a.

[¶59.] GILBERTSON, Retired Chief Justice, dissents on Issue 2a.

[¶60.] SALTER, Justice, concurs on Issue 2b.

[¶61.] GILBERTSON, Retired Chief Justice, concurs in result on Issue 2b.

[¶62.] KERN, and DEVANEY, Justices, dissent on Issue 2b.

 

Of particular interest is the position of Justice Kern (as to which Justice DeVaney concurs), on the Issue 2b, the excessive force claim, as expressed in ¶65 and ¶72:

 

[¶65.] However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to dismiss the Hamens’ alternative claim for excessive use of force. In my view, we should instead affirm the circuit court’s order denying the Sheriff’s motion for summary judgment on this issue. This claim should also proceed to trial, where the jury can determine through special interrogatories any disputed issues of fact. The court can then resolve the questions of law.

[¶72.] The nature and extent of the force used here is undisputed and well documented. A police drone circled above the scene, capturing some of the incident on video, and the officers involved prepared detailed reports of the episode. The first armored vehicle approached from the west side pulling the front stairs and deck away from the trailer. It then tore off the front door of the trailer with a ram, damaging not only the door but the floor and frame. The second armored vehicle drilled three portholes on the other side through windows and a sliding glass door, destroying the septic system in the process. Minutes later, the drone captured images of Gary walking in the river near the Hamens’ trailer.

 

Justice Kern’s position is supported by 4 color photos included as part of her opinion.

 

WINGS AS EAGLES MINISTRIES, INC. v. OGLALA LAKOTA COUNTY, 2021 S.D. 8: Wings as Eagles Ministries is a 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation under the Internal Revenue Code.  It is exempt from paying sales tax.  This is a dispute over property taxes sought by Oglala Lakota County.  The 1st and last paragraphs of the opinion describe the result of this litigation:

 

[¶1.] Wings as Eagles Ministries, Inc. (Wings) applied for property tax exempt status for the 2014 and 2015 tax years, payable in 2015 and 2016 respectively. Both applications were denied and became final determinations of the property’s exempt status for the affected years. Wings subsequently filed a petition with the Oglala Lakota County Commission (the Commission) seeking an abatement of its property taxes for 2014 and 2015. The Commission denied the petition, and Wings appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed the Commission’s decision. Wings now appeals the abatement decision to this Court. We affirm.

          …

[¶24.] The circuit court correctly recognized that Wings was not exempt from property taxes for 2014 and 2015, and therefore, the Commission lacked authority to consider an abatement under SDCL 10-18-1(3). Moreover, Wings’ estoppel argument is unreviewable because it was raised for the first time on appeal and is otherwise not sufficiently developed in the record. We affirm.

 

The Court’s opinion is unanimous (5-0) with opinion authored by Justice Salter.

 

J. CLANCY, INC. v. KHAN COMFORT, LLC, 2021 S.D. 9:  This case involves the assertion of a mechanic’s liens, supported by alternative claims of breach of contract and unjust enrichment, in Lawrence County.  The case was submitted to the SD Supreme Court on the briefs on September 30, 2019, over 16 months ago.  The dispute, as resolved at both the trial level and on this appeal is set forth in the first two paragraphs of the Court’s opinion, as well as the concluding paragraph:

 

[¶1.] J. Clancy, Inc. (J. Clancy), a construction company owned by Jere Clancy, sued Ghazanfar Khan (Khan) and his company, Khan Comfort, LLC (Khan Comfort), seeking enforcement of mechanic’s liens it placed against the property. In the alternative, J. Clancy filed claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Khan Comfort filed several counterclaims, including claims for overpayment and breach of contract.

 

[¶2.] After a bench trial, the circuit court concluded that J. Clancy’s mechanic’s liens were invalid and unenforceable because, in part, they were insufficiently itemized. It also held that a divisible, implied-in-fact contract, rather than an express contract, governed the relationship between the parties. The court rejected J. Clancy’s breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims against Khan Comfort and instead found that J. Clancy breached the contract due to nonperformance. It allowed J. Clancy to recover for the portions of the contract it had actually performed, but it ultimately determined that the value of J. Clancy’s work was less than the payments Khan Comfort had already made. Accordingly, the court ordered J. Clancy to reimburse Khan Comfort for the overpayment. We reverse the circuit court’s decision in part and remand for new determinations regarding breach and damages under the terms of the parties’ contract.

[¶45.] The trial court erred in holding that a divisible implied-in-fact contract controlled the parties’ express agreement, and we reverse and vacate the court’s conclusions which hold otherwise. On remand, the court must undertake a determination of breach and remedies available to the parties under the express terms of the September document and any agreed-upon change orders. We also reverse the trial court’s decision to invalidate both mechanic’s liens filed by J. Clancy. After determining the questions of breach and damages on remand, the court should then determine whether J. Clancy is entitled to foreclose on either lien for any amounts covered thereunder to which the court determines it is entitled. Because J. Clancy failed to make arguments regarding its conversion claim to the circuit court, we decline to address the issue on appeal. Finally, because a valid, express contract controls the parties’ obligations, the parties may not proceed for equitable relief.

 

The Court’s decision is unanimous (5-0) with opinion authored by Justice Kern.

 

These decisions may be accessed at

 

http://ujs.sd.gov/Supreme_Court/opinions.aspx .