SD permitted to entertain work comp claim for injury in Wyoming

 The SD Supreme Court handed down one decision this morning, holding inter alia: 

 

1. SD is authorized to entertain work comp claim for accident occurring in Wyoming notwithstanding previous claim in Wyoming

 

Summary follows:

 

ANDERSON v. TRI STATE CONSTRUCTION, 2021 S.D. 50:  This is an attempt to file a work comp claim in South Dakota in connection with an injury that occurred in Wyoming.  Employer is a corporation formed and headquartered in SD.  After initially filing a claim in Wyoming and receiving benefits there, employee realized that SD’s law were more favorable than Wyoming’s law.  (Employee “discovered that Wyoming law limited her eligibility to collect total disability benefits to 80 months, whereas in South Dakota, she could be eligible to receive permanent total disability benefits.”)  The DOL dismissed the claim for lack of jurisdiction and the Circuit Court affirmed.  The SD Supreme Court reversed and remanded, stating:

 

[W]e hold that South Dakota has a substantial connection to Anderson and Tri State’s employment relationship sufficient to  provide the Department with authority to adjudicate Anderson’s claim.  Accordingly, Anderson’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits does not offend principles of due process. Martin, 2011 S.D. 57, ¶ 9, 804 N.W.2d at 67.

 

This decision is unanimous (5-0) with opinion authored by Justice Kern.   

 

 

This decision may be accessed at

 

http://ujs.sd.gov/Supreme_Court/opinions.aspx .

 

Two new decisions today by SD Supreme Court

 

The SD Supreme Court handed down two decisions this morning:

1. Letter to Work Comp Insurer did not constitute Petition for Review; and
2. Termination of Joint Tenancy without notice and hearing reversed

 

Summaries follows:

 MAY v. SPEARFISH PELLETT CO., LLC, 2021 S.D. 48:  Injured employee sent a letter to work comp insurer seeking a review of its determination as to the extent of compensation benefits it was paying.  Employee also sent copy of this letter to SD Dept. of Labor.  DOL did not treat the letter as a Petition for Hearing.  Some 4 years later employee requested the DOL to treat the letter as a Petition for Hearing.  The DOL denied the request. The lower court affirmed.  And, the SD Supreme Court affirmed, holding:

 

[¶13.] Due to the stated inadequacies, the Department and the circuit court did not err by determining that the February 2014 letter was not a petition for hearing under ARSD 47:03:01:02. We affirm the circuit court’s decision.

 

This ruling is unanimous (5-0) with opinion authored by Justice Myren.

 

ESTATE OF PETRIK, 2021 S.D. 49:  This a dispute following the death of Mother who had 5 children.  Mother owned substantial amount of real estate in Charles Mix County.  Part of her real estate was held in joint tenancy with a son who died subsequent to Mother’s death.  The trial court terminated the “joint tenancy” on this property without notice and hearing to affected parties.  The SD Supreme Court reversed and remanded.  This ruling is unanimous (4-0) with opinion authored by Justice Salter.  Justice Kern did not participate in this case. 

 

These decisions may be accessed at

http://ujs.sd.gov/Supreme_Court/opinions.aspx .

 

 

Appeal from partial summary judgment dismissed

 The SD Supreme Court handed down one decision this morning, holding inter alia:

 

1. Appeal from partial summary judgment dismissed

 

Summary follows:

 

NELSON v. CAMPBELL, 2021 S.D. 47:  The Court dismisses an appeal which was taken from a summary judgment which only partially resolved the issues in the underlying dispute.  The opening paragraph of the opinion describes the dispute, the trial court’s ruling and basic information relating to today’s ruling:

 

[¶1.] After one of three founding members of a cooperative grazing  association passed away, his estate invoked a provision of the association’s bylaws  to withdraw previously-contributed real estate and sell it to a third party. Another  member objected, asserting: 1) the estate was contractually obligated to sell the real  estate to him because he submitted the high bid; and 2) the estate was obligated  under the grazing association’s bylaws to allow him a right of first refusal to  purchase the real estate. The circuit court granted the estate’s motion for summary  judgment on these claims, but its decision did not resolve all of the claims among  the parties. The court certified only the summary judgment order directing the  association to allow the estate’s withdrawal as final under the provisions of SDCL  15-6-54(b). For the reasons explained below, however, we dismiss the appeal.

 

The ruling is unanimous (5-0) with opinion authored by Justice Salter. 

 

This decision may be accessed at

 

http://ujs.sd.gov/Supreme_Court/opinions.aspx .

124 year sentence reversed, concept of "imperfect self-defense" addressed

 

The SD Supreme Court handed down one decision this morning, holding inter alia: 

 

1. Sentence of 124 years to Manslaughter 1^st Degree reversed; “imperfect self-defense” concept addressed

 

Summary follows:

 

STATE v. MITCHELL, 2021 S.D. 46:   Defendant, originally charged with 1^st Degree Murder, pled guilty to reduced charge of 1^st Degree Manslaughter.  State recommended sentence of 60 years. Victim’s family requested sentence of life imprisonment.  Trial Court sentenced Defendant to 124 years.  The SD Supreme Court reversed and remanded, stating that, “in order to accurately assess the nature of [Defendant’s] conduct, the [trial] court must consider the fact that he was reacting to a threat posed by [the Victim’s] own assaultive conduct.”  This opinion discusses, for the first time in South Dakota jurisprudence, the notion of an “imperfect self-defense” which is described in ¶36 as follows:

 

Contrasted from a “perfect” self-defense claim where the defendant is “free from  fault in bringing about difficulty with his adversary” and “reasonably believe[d]” he  needed to respond to an adversary’s threat with deadly force, an imperfect self-defense presents manslaughter as a different option for criminal liability, short of  murder and without the potential of an outright acquittal. Wayne R. LaFave,  Substantive Criminal Law, § 15.3(a) (2020). The reason for the “imperfection” can  either be “the defendant’s own fault in bringing on the difficulty or the unreasonableness of [his] honest but erroneous belief[]” that he is in danger of  serious or fatal injury which he can prevent only by killing the victim. Id. 

 

The Court states, also in ¶36,  that the imperfect self-defense concept is fostered in SDCL 22-16-15(4) which is the operative statutory provision to which Defendant pled guilty. 

 

The incident resulting in the shooting death of the victim was capture by video recording which was reviewed by the trial court and the SD Supreme Court.  The basic facts, as described in the opening paragraph of the Court’s opinion are as follows:

 

[¶1.] After a brief confrontation with Lucas Smith at a local bar, Jameson  Mitchell armed himself with a handgun and encountered Smith in a nearby alley.  Smith ran toward Mitchell, shouting for Mitchell to shoot him. After taking a few steps back, Mitchell fired at the charging Smith, fatally wounding him.

 

The Court’s opinion is authored by Justice Salter, with all 5 justices participating.  (Note: Retired Chief Justice Gilbertson participated, not Justice Myren who was not on the bench at the time case was submitted.)

 

Justice DeVaney filed a concurring opinion in order to “further expound on why such a harsh sentence constitutes an abuse of discretion.”  Justice DeVaney further states:

 

[¶48.] There is also no question that a sentencing court is free to disregard  the recommendations of the parties, as well as those of the PSI author if, in the #29194 -19- court’s judgment, a much higher sentence is warranted. But in this case, after  watching the video and reviewing the PSI, it is apparent that a 124-year sentence— more than twice that recommended by those most familiar with the parties and the  facts of the case—was not a choice within “the range of permissible choices[.]” See  MacKaben, 2015 S.D. 86, ¶ 9, 871 N.W.2d at 622 (citation omitted) (explaining what  constitutes an abuse of discretion).

 

This decision may be accessed at

 

http://ujs.sd.gov/Supreme_Court/opinions.aspx .