SD Supreme Court releases decision regarding attack by pit bull

 

The SD Supreme Court handed down one decision this morning, holding inter alia:

 

1. Tort claim against landlord for injuries by dog fails

 

Summary follows:

 

BURGI v. EAST WINDS COURT, INC., 2022 S.D. 6:  This is an action for injuries inflicted on a child by a pit bull when the child sought to retrieve an errant basketball which wandered into the zone of the dog’s leashed confinement.  The facts and disposition in this matter are summarized in the opening paragraph of the opinion, as follows:

 

[¶1.] Teresa Burgi’s minor son, K.B., was attacked by a neighbor’s dog near their home in a trailer court owned by her landlord. Teresa commenced this action against the landlord, alleging two negligence theories and a breach of contract claim. The circuit court granted the landlord’s motion for summary judgment on each claim. Teresa appeals the court’s decision solely as to her general negligence claim. We affirm.

 

This ruling is unanimous (5-0) with the Court’s opinion authored by Justice Salter. 

This decision may be accessed at

 

http://ujs.sd.gov/Supreme_Court/opinions.aspx .

 

 

South Dakota Supreme Court releases 3 new decisions

 

NOTE:  The 2^nd and 3^rd case present similar scenarios.  In both of these cases, Justice Kern dissented, asserting that a summary affirmance in a direct appeal may not, in most situations, serve as the basis for issue preclusion in a subsequent habeas action premised upon ineffective assistance of counsel.  Also note: Justice Myren did not participate in these decisions. 

 

The SD Supreme Court handed down two decisions this morning:

 

1)    UM coverage denied victims of motorcycle accident;

 

2)   Habeas relief denied in 4-1 ruling, relying upon summary affirmance in inmate’s direct appeal;

 

3)   Habeas relief denied in 4-1 ruling, relying upon summary affirmance in inmate’s direct appeal.

 

Summaries follows:

 

PAYNE v. STATE FARM, 2022 S.D. 3:  This dispute involves the issue UM insurance coverage intermingled with a choice of law analysis.  The opening paragraph of the Opinion explains:

 

[¶1.] John and Robin Payne (the Paynes) were denied uninsured motorist (UM) benefits under their State Farm personal liability umbrella insurance policy following a motorcycle accident with an uninsured vehicle in South Dakota. State Farm denied coverage for the accident because the policy, first executed in Virginia, did not include UM coverage. The Paynes, residents of Florida at the time of the accident, filed a declaratory action against State Farm seeking payment of $2,000,000 under Florida’s UM statute, which they contend applies to this dispute. State Farm moved for summary judgment claiming Virginia, rather than Florida, law applied. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding Florida law applied to the dispute. The Paynes moved for declaratory relief which the court denied, holding that Florida law only required the insurer of a personal liability umbrella policy to offer UM coverage when the insured applied for the policy or made a written request to their insurer for UM coverage, conditions not met by the Paynes. The Paynes appeal.

 

The trial court’s analysis resulted in a denial of UM coverage to the Paynes.  The SD Supreme Court affirmed in a unanimous (5-0) ruling, with opinion authored by Justice Kern. 

 

NEELS v. DOOLEY, 2022 S.D. 4:  This is a post-conviction habeas corpus proceeding challenging convictions on multiple counts.  The grounds are premised upon alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.  The trial court (habeas court) denied relief because the inmate’s direct appeal presented the same issues which underly the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  The SD Supreme Court affirmed in a 4-1 ruling.  The Court’s opinion is authored by Justice DeVaney.  NOTE:  Former CJ Gilbertson, not Justice Myren, participated in this decision which was submitted to the Court on August 20, 2020.

 

Justice Kern filed a dissenting opinion, stating that the language of the summary affirmance in the direct appeal did not actually address one of the inmate’s habeas grounds and that, “issue preclusion may only foreclose relitigation of matters that have already been ‘litigated and decided.’”  Justice Kern further states:

 

[¶32.] The writ of habeas corpus is the last line of defense within our state judicial system against deprivations of basic constitutional rights in criminal matters. When, on direct appeal, this Court declines to specifically address a defendant’s claims in a written opinion, or in a summary order, it creates uncertainty as to the preclusive effect of the direct appeal on a subsequent habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. For this reason, res judicata should be applied to habeas corpus petitions in only the clearest of circumstances by this Court—not based on a summary conclusion in an order of affirmance.

 

HARRIS v. FLUKE, 2022 S.D. 5: This is a post-conviction habeas corpus proceeding challenging inmate’s conviction of 3^rd degree rape.  The grounds are premised upon alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.  The trial court (habeas court) denied relief because the inmate’s direct appeal presented the same issues which underly the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  The SD Supreme Court affirmed in a 4-1 ruling.  The Court’s opinion is authored by Justice DeVaney.  NOTE:  Former CJ Gilbertson, not Justice Myren, participated in this decision which was submitted to the Court on August 20, 2020. 

 

Justice Kern filed a dissenting opinion, stating that the language of the summary affirmance in the direct appeal did not actually address one of the inmate’s habeas grounds, stating:

 

[¶19.] As in Neels v. Dooley, the majority opinion infers from the summary affirmance language quoted above that this Court found “either no error or no prejudice” from the alleged improper vouching on direct appeal. 2022 S.D. 4, ¶ 24, __ N.W.2d at ___. However, the summary affirmance language here and the majority opinion’s inference therefrom does not satisfy the applicable res judicata requirement that a matter must have been already litigated and decided to foreclose litigation of that matter.  Here, the summary affirmance language lacks a decision from this Court on the issue of prejudice arising from alleged improper vouching. Therefore, this issue is not properly precluded under the doctrine of res judicata.

 

These decisions may be accessed at

 

http://ujs.sd.gov/Supreme_Court/opinions.aspx .

 

Appeal Dismissed, Rule 54(b) requirements not satisfied

 

The SD Supreme Court handed down one decision this morning, holding inter alia:

 

1)    Appeal Dismissed, Rule 54(b) requirements not satisfied

 

Summary follows:

 

FIRST NATIONAL BANK v. INGHRAM, 2022 S.D. 2: Plaintiff Bank filed suit to foreclose on real estate and for replevin of business property.  Defendants counterclaimed fraud, deceit, breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty.  The trial court ruled favorably for the bank on its claims, certifying its decision as final for purpose of appeal pursuant to SDCL 25-6-54(b).  Defendants appealed.  The SD Supreme Court dismissed the appeal because the “certification order” did not adequately satisfy the requirements of Rule 54(b).  This decision is unanimous with opinion authored by Justice Kern.

 

Due to the importance of this ruling, I am reproducing Rule 54(b) below, together with quoted material found in ¶¶ 31 & 37  of the Court’s opinion:

 

SDCL 15-6-54(b) provides:

When multiple claims for relief or multiple parties are involved in an action, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates ewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating g all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.

 

And the entirety of ¶31:

 

[¶31.] While a “court may enter a final judgment on a single issue in a multi-claim case under SDCL 15-6-54(b),” we have repeatedly held that courts should not routinely enter such judgments and that they are only appropriate when justified by special circumstances. Stromberger Farms, Inc., 2020 S.D. 22, ¶ 22, 942 N.W.2d at 256. “Rule 54(b) certification is not a procedural formality.” Weisser v. Jackson Twp. of Charles Mix Cnty., 2009 S.D. 43, ¶ 4, 767 N.W.2d 888, 889. The purpose of Rule 54(b) certification is to “improve[ ] [the] administration of justice,” not to provide “a courtesy or accommodation to counsel.” Davis v. Farmland Mut. Ins. Co., 2003 S.D. 111, ¶ 13, 669 N.W.2d 713, 718 (citation omitted). To further this purpose, we have identified three principles to guide a court in a Rule 54(b) analysis:

(1)  the burden is on the party seeking final certification to convince the trial court that the case is the “infrequent harsh case” meriting a favorable exercise of discretion; (2) the trial court must balance the competing factors present in the case to determine if it is in the best interest of sound judicial administration and public policy to certify the judgment as final; (3) the trial court must marshal and articulate the factors upon which it relied in granting certification so that prompt and effective review can be facilitated.

Nelson v. Est. of Campbell, 2021 S.D. 47, ¶ 27, 963 N.W.2d 560, 568 (quoting Davis, 2003 S.D. 111, ¶ 13, 669 N.W.2d at 718–19). Nelson also notes several factors that may bear upon a court’s decision to allow Rule 54(b) certification, including:

(1)  the relationship between the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims; (2) the possibility that the need for review might or might not be mooted by future developments in the [trial] court; (3) the possibility that the reviewing court might be obliged to consider the same issue a second time; (4) the presence or absence of a claim or counterclaim which could result in setoff against the judgment sought to be made final; (5) miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic and solvency considerations, shortening the time of trial, frivolity of competing claims, expense, and the like.

Id. ¶ 28, 963 N.W.2d at 568–69 (citation omitted).

 

And a portion of ¶ 37:

 

[¶37.] … We have repeatedly held that a court “must include a reasoned statement in support of its determination . . . where the justification for the certificate is not apparent.” Jacquot, 2010 S.D. 84, ¶ 14, 790 N.W.2d at 503 (citation omitted). This mandatory requirement is missing from the record before us.

 

This decision may be accessed at

 

http://ujs.sd.gov/Supreme_Court/opinions.aspx .

City of Rapid City prevails on Tort Claim

 The SD Supreme Court handed down one decision this morning, holding inter alia:

 

1. Tort claim against City of Rapid City denied

 

Summary follows:

 

GODBE v. CITY OF RAPID CITY, 2022 S.D. 1:  This lawsuit is described in the opening paragraph of the Court’s opinion:

 

[¶1.] Julie Godbe suffered horrific injuries after her bicycle tire caught in a  storm drain grate in Rapid City (City). Julie and her husband David (Godbes) sued  City for negligence. The circuit court granted City’s motion for summary judgment,  determining Godbes failed to generate a genuine issue of material fact showing that  City breached its statutory duty under SDCL 31-32-10.

 

The SD Supreme Court affirmed in a 4-1 ruling. The Court’s opinion is authored by Chief Justice Jensen.  Retired Chief Justice Gilbertson participated in this decision which was orally argued on November 18, 2020.  Justice Kern dissented.

 

This decision may be accessed at

 

http://ujs.sd.gov/Supreme_Court/opinions.aspx .