Restrictive Convenant held null & void due to non-enforcement; Drive-By Shooting convictions affirmed; Trial Court's grant of habeas relief reversed

 The SD Supreme Court handed down three decisions this morning:

 

1)    Restrictive Covenant held null and void, on equitable principle of non-enforcement;

2)   Drive-by shooting convictions upheld;

3) Trial Court’s grant of Habeas Relief Reversed.

  

Summaries follows:

 

HOOD v. STRAATMEYER, 2025 S.D. 12: Plaintiffs are “neighbors [who] sued [Defendants] to enjoin them from constructing a house and a large three-car garage” in a subdivision on the basis that such construction violated a 1976 restrictive covenant. “After a bench trial, the circuit court declared the covenant null and void … conclud[ing] it would be inequitable to enforce the covenant because it had never been previously enforced despite numerous violations.”  The SD Supreme Court affirmed in a unanimous (5-0) ruling, with opinion authored by Justice Myren.  Circuit Judge Rank participated in this decision, in lieu of Justice Kern.  NOTE: this case was orally argued some 16 months ago, on March 8, 2023. 

 

STATE v. TURNER, 2025 S.D. 13: Arising from facts involving a drive-by shooting in Sioux Falls, Defendant was convicted by jury “on two counts of aggravated assault and four counts of discharge of a firearm in violation of SDCL 22-14-20.”  Defendant’s appeal is predicated upon numerous assertions, as summarized in the opening paragraph of the opinion:

[¶1.] Throughout the proceedings, [Defendant] filed several motions, including a motion to suppress, a motion to dismiss, a motion for judgment of acquittal, and a motion for a new trial. The circuit court denied each of these requests. [Defendant] objected to the introduction of a screenshot photograph of a traffic camera video; the circuit court overruled this objection. At the end of the trial, the circuit court rejected three jury instructions proposed by [Defendant]. [Defendant] now appeals the circuit court’s denial of each of those motions, the admission of the photograph, and the denial of his proposed jury instructions.

The SD Supreme Court rejected Defendant’s assertions and affirmed the lower court in a unanimous (5-0) ruling, with opinion authored by Justice Myren.

 

 

GONZALES v. MARKLAND, 2025 S.D. 14: Female Defendant “was convicted in 2014 by a jury, comprised of Brule and Buffalo County residents, of beating her boyfriend’s son to death.”  This conviction was summarily affirmed on appeal in State v. Gonzales, 877 N.W.2d 106 (S.D. 2016).  Defendant was originally “sentenced to 130 years in prison for the manslaughter conviction and a concurrent 15 years for the assault.”  The original sentence “was later reduced to 90 years with 50 suspended.”   Subsequently, Defendant brought this habeas corpus action asserting an improper cross section of the community for jurors through a dilution of Native American participants and also ineffective assistance of counsel.  The proceedings occurred in the 1^st Judicial Circuit but all of the Judges in the 1st Circuit recused themselves.  A judge from another Circuit was assigned to the Habeas Corpus proceeding.  The Habeas trial last three days with testimony from several witnesses, including “the tribal treasurer of the Crow Creek Tribe, the Court Administrator for the First Judicial Circuit,” and at least 4 notable attorneys.  The trial court did not rule on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, but did find for Defendant on the “cross section” issue, stating:

“[a]pplication of the blended jury pool district concept in this case had the pernicious effect of excluding members of [Defendant’s] community and race from the process that determined her liberty.”

The SD Supreme Court disagreed with the Habeas trial court, reversed and remanded for a final adjudication, denying relief to Defendant on all bases.  The Court’s ruling is unanimous (4-1), with opinion authored by Justice Kern.  

Circuit Judge Hendrickson sat on this case, in lieu of Chief Justice Jensen. Justice Salter filed a concurring opinion.  

NOTE:  Of primary interest in the reasoning of the trial court (and subsequent analysis by the Supreme Court) is the historical “concept of the vicinage.” 

 

These decisions may be accessed at

 

http://ujs.sd.gov/Supreme_Court/opinions.aspx .

 

Mother/Son Dispute Addressed

 The SD Supreme Court handed down one decision this morning, holding, inter alia:

 

1)    Mother/Son Dispute addressed

 

 

Summary follows:

 

LANGBEHN v. LANGBEHN, 2025 S.D. 11:  This dispute is between a Mother and her Son involving “a substantial amount of crop and pastureland in Beadle County,” which Mother and her Husband (Son’s father) owned during their marriage.  Husband/Father died in March, 2008 and this litigation evolved.  Below is the opening paragraph of the Court’s opinion (which gives an overview) and also the final paragraph of the Court’s opinion (which gives a summary of the result on appeal):

 

[¶1.] Mary Langbehn sued her son, Michael Langbehn, and his company, Langbehn Land and Cattle Co. (LL&C), alleging Michael breached his fiduciary duty as a co-trustee of his deceased father’s trust. Michael filed counterclaims for unjust enrichment and quantum meruit relating to improvements he claimed to have made to real estate he leased from his father’s trust and Mary’s separate living trust. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Mary on her claims as well as on Michael’s counterclaims. The court also removed Michael as a co-trustee and awarded Mary $513,796.94 in damages. Michael appeals. We reverse.

***

[¶56.] Because Michael did not engage in impermissible self-dealing and genuine issues of material fact remain concerning whether Michael breached his fiduciary duty to the credit trust, we reverse the circuit court’s decision to grant summary judgment and its decision to remove him as a co-trustee. However, we affirm the court’s decision to grant summary judgment on Michael’s counterclaims. The case is remanded for further proceedings in part, affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings.

This decision is unanimous with opinion authored by Justice Salter.

 

This decision may be accessed at

 

http://ujs.sd.gov/Supreme_Court/opinions.aspx .

Tort Verdict agains Highway Patrolman upheld; Medical Cannabis Dispensary prevails in license request

 The SD Supreme Court handed down two decisions this morning:

 

1)    Tort verdict against Highway Patrolman upheld;

 

2)   Medical Cannabis Dispensary prevails in license request;

  

Summaries follows:

WEILAND v. BUMANN, 2025 S.D. 9:  This is a personal injury suit against a Highway Patrolman for a motor vehicle accident in which the Patrolman’s “immediate supervisor, determined that [the Patrolman] violated SDHP safety policies and that the accident was preventable.”  Plaintiff’s claims are premised on 1 Count of Negligence and 5 Counts of Negligence Per Se’ (citing 5 separate traffic offenses).  The jury awarded Plaintiff $21,122.25, consisting of, “$17,500 in non-economic damages and $1,161.50 in past medical expenses.”  The trial court entered judgment for Plaintiff on the verdict. Plaintiff appealed and Defendant filed a cross appeal.  The SD Supreme Court affirmed.  This decision is unanimous (5-0) with opinion authored by Justice Salter.  (Note: This accident occurred in Minnehaha County and was investigated by a Minnehaha County Deputy Sheriff who prepared an Accident Report.)

PUFFY’S, LLC v. DEP’T OF HEALTH, 2025 S.D. 10:  Medical Cannabis Dispensary prevails in dispute with State regarding State’s failure to appropriately issue it a license.  The history, facts, and result are reported in the opening paragraph of the Court’s opinion as follows:

 

[¶1.] Puffy’s, LLC was first in line on a waiting list to receive a state registration certificate from the South Dakota Department of Health (Department). The certificate was required in order to operate a medical cannabis dispensary in Rapid City (City). After the Department failed to issue the certificate, Puffy’s brought a mandamus action in circuit court seeking an order compelling the Department to issue the certificate to Puffy’s. The circuit court granted the writ of mandamus. The Department appeals, claiming the court lacked jurisdiction, or in the alternative, abused its discretion in granting the writ. We affirm.

 

This ruling is unanimous (5-0), with opinion authored by Justice DeVaney.

These decisions may be accessed at

 

http://ujs.sd.gov/Supreme_Court/opinions.aspx .

 

 

SD Supreme Court hands down 5 decisions, mixed bag of reversals and separate opinions

The SD Supreme Court handed down five decisions this morning:

 

1)   Reemployment benefits appropriate;

2) Set back restriction upheld by Supreme Court;

3) Defense verdict in personal injury action upheld by 4-1 ruling

4) Collateral attack under Rule 60(b)(6) permitted by Supreme Court;

5) Eviction from 5200 acre farm upheld.

  

Summaries follows:

 

BLACK HILLS ADVENTURE LODGING, LLC v. DLR, REEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE DIVISION, 2025 S.D. 4:  This case involves an application, “for reemployment assistance benefits with the South Dakota Department of Labor and Regulation” by an individual who cleaned cabins. The defense was that she was an independent contractor, not an employee.   The ALJ and the Circuit Court ruled that this an employment situation and “ordered [Employer] to pay into the unemployment compensation fund based on the wages paid to [employee] and others similarly situated to her.”  The SD Supreme Court affirmed, but ordered that the language “and others similarly situated” was a ‘bridge too far’ (my words, not the Court’s) because:

[¶38.] Permitting the Department to hold [Employer] liable for “others similarly situated” to [Employee] would run directly counter to the individualized analysis that must be made to determine whether an individual is an employee of a putative employer.

 

This decision is unanimous (5-0), with opinion authored by Chief Justice Jensen. 

DECRAMER v. DORALE, MCCOOK COUNTY BD OF ADJUSTMENT, 2025 S.D. 5: County Board of Adjustment granted variance from 9 foot setback rule (“structures must be set back a minimum of nine feet from neighboring property lines”) to home builder after he had already constructed his house.  The Circuit Court denied relief to neighbor, sought by a petition for writ of certiorari.  The SD Supreme Court reversed, stating:

[¶22.] Because the Board acted illegally and in excess of its authority by granting a variance that did not comply with either SDCL 11-2-53(2) or the Ordinance, the circuit court should have reversed the decision of the Board and vacated the grant of the variance.

This decision is unanimous (5-0) with opinion authored by Justice DeVaney. 

GEERDES v. LIKNESS, 2025 S.D. 6:  This is a personal injury action arising out of a motor vehicle accident.  The jury found for the Defendant on the issue of causation.  Plaintiff’s Motion for New Trial, premised on the assertion that Defendant hadadmitted causation, was denied.  The SD Supreme Court affirmed, in a (4-1) ruling.  The Court’s opinion is authored by Justice Myren.  Justice Kern dissented, stating:

[¶30.] In my view, defense counsel admitted causation and the circuit court erred in submitting the causation question to the jury and abused its discretion in denying Geerdes’ motion for a new trial.

ESTATE OF MACK, 2025 S.D. 7:  This is a collateral attack upon a probate order of distribution. The attack is lodged under SDCL 15-6-60(b)(6) – “Any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.”  The recipient’s attorney at the time had not communicated with the recipient and was in the process of being disciplined by the State Bar.  The trial court denied relief.  But, the SD Supreme Court reversed, holding:

[¶25.] Based upon [Recipient’s] unrefuted affidavit and the pending disciplinary proceedings at the time involving [his attorney], in which the Board expressed “serious concerns” about his ability to practice law, we conclude that extraordinary circumstances existed as required by Rule 60(b)(6) to set aside the order of distribution. Because the circuit court determined the distribution was fair and equitable, it concluded that no injustice would occur by denying the motion to vacate. The circuit court’s assessment of the distribution was not based on a current valuation of the estate assets and was made without affording Robert an opportunity for a hearing on the proposed distribution. Under these circumstances, the circuit court abused its discretion in denying the motion to vacate the order for distribution pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6).

 

This ruling is unanimous (5-0), with opinion authored by Justice Myren.

STOCK v. GARRETT, 2025 S.D. 8: This litigation involves 5,200 acres of farm land in Sully County apparently worth slightly more than $10 million.  The plaintiffs sued claiming a right to possession under a lease with an option to purchase, alleging a default in the lease payments.  Jury trial resulted in a verdict for Plaintiffs which the trial court enforced by ordering eviction.  The SD Supreme Court affirmed.  All five justices voted to affirm in a 3-2 ruling.  The majority opinion is authored by Chief Justice Jensen.  Justice DeVaney filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kern agreed.  The litigation was complicated by the fact a parallel proceeding had been filed in federal court by Plaintiffs.  The purpose of Justice DeVaney’s concurring opinion is to express another view in regard to the federal court proceeding, as explained by Justice DeVaney as follows:

[¶65.] I concur with the majority opinion, but I write separately on the parallel litigation issue because I arrive at the same result in a different manner.

These decisions may be accessed at

 

http://ujs.sd.gov/Supreme_Court/opinions.aspx .

 

  

Two Decisions by SD Supreme Court this morning

 The SD Supreme Court handed down two decisions this morning:

1)    3-2 decision involving forcible entry and detainer action;

 

2)   Patient’s doctor owes no duty of care to subsequent victim of patient’s seizure-causing accident;

  

Summaries follows:

 

VOR, INC. v. ESTATE OF O’FARRELL, 2025 S.D. 2:  This a somewhat complicated scenario, the gist of which is described as follows in the opening paragraph of the Court’s Opinion:

[¶1.] VOR, Inc. and the Grand Valley Hutterite Brethren (Colony) brought an eviction action against Paul O’Farrell and Paul’s company, Skyline Cattle Co. (Skyline), under South Dakota’s forcible entry and detainer (FED) statutes. Paul moved to dismiss the suit and argued, among other things, that the eviction should have been brought as a compulsory counterclaim in Paul’s pending undue influence suit against his brother Kelly, the Colony, and the Raymond and Victoria O’Farrell Living Trust (Trust). After the circuit court denied Paul’s motion to dismiss, Paul filed an answer demanding a jury trial and requested a continuance. The circuit court denied the continuance request and proceeded with a court trial. The circuit court granted the eviction, ordered Paul to vacate the property within ten days, and permitted the Colony to keep any of Paul’s personal property abandoned after the ten days expired. Paul now appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

The Court’s ruling is a 3-2 decision which holds:

[¶44.] The plain reading of the FED statutes does not permit such a forfeiture. No party presented any authority supporting the circuit court’s action, and our research has not yielded any support. The circuit court’s forfeiture of Paul’s personal property was unsupported by law and, therefore, erroneous.

[¶45.] We affirm the eviction but remand with direction to the circuit court to revise the judgment consistent with this decision.

The Court also awards plaintiffs appellate attorney fees of $ 9,000, stating, “SDCL 21-16-11 authorizes an award of attorneys’ fees for forcible entry and detainer actions[.]” (Plaintiffs had submitted an itemized statement requesting a total award of $18,382.86.)

The majority opinion is authored by Justice  Myren. 

Justice DeVaney filed an opinion which dissents in part, stating as follows:

[¶79.] The circuit court’s rulings have effectively precluded Paul and Skyline from fully and fairly litigating the issue of who has the right to immediate possession of this Property. I would therefore reverse the above-mentioned rulings by the circuit court, vacate the judgment and order entered in this case, and remand for the entry of an order either dismissing the FED action or, in the alternative, holding it in abeyance until the underlying issues relevant to the right to immediate possession of the Property are resolved in Paul and Skyline’s preexisting lawsuit. 

Justice Kern concurs with Justice DeVaney. 

TWO EAGLE v. AVEL ECARE, 2025 S.D. 3: Tort plaintiff was injured by driver who suffered a seizure while driving, crashing into plaintiff who was on a riding lawnmower, off the roadway.  Plaintiff sued a doctor and related medical care facilities on malpractice and negligence theories relating the doctor’s seeming erroneous grant of permission of driving privileges to driver who had history of seizures.  The trial court granted summary judgment relief to Defendants because the doctor “did not owe a duty of care” to tort plaintiff.  The SD Supreme Court affirmed.  The ruling is unanimous (4 & 1 - 0), with majority opinion authored by Justice Myren.  Justice Salter filed a concurring opinion.

These decisions may be accessed at

 

http://ujs.sd.gov/Supreme_Court/opinions.aspx .

 

Requirement of Property Disclosure Statement Analyzed

 

The SD Supreme Court handed down one decision this morning, holding, inter alia:

 

1)    Property Disclosure Statement Requirement Fleshed Out

 

 

Summary follows:

 

REMINGTON v. IVERSON, 2025 S.D. 1: Suit arising out of real estate transaction.  Buyers sued Sellers and Real Estate Agent.  Trial court granted summary judgment against Buyers holding, inter alia, that “a property disclosure statement was not required because the sale was a commercial transaction.”

The SD Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded, holding that a portion of the real estate constituted a residence and was, therefore, subject to the requirements related to a disclosure statement.  The Court stated:

[¶50.] As their real estate agent, Iverson owed the Remingtons a fiduciary duty. A property disclosure statement was required for the living quarters which constitute residential real property. We reverse the circuit court’s determination to the contrary. As to the non-residential aspects of the Campground, however, we affirm the court’s determination that a seller’s disclosure statement was not required. But the existence and extent of this statutory disclosure obligation was not clear until our decision here, and a remand is necessary to determine whether Iverson breached his duty to the Remingtons under the particular facts of this case.

[¶51.] We affirm the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment on the claims of Iverson’s direct liability. Iverson cannot be liable for his failure to personally disclose alleged material defects relating to the property because the Remingtons have failed to establish that a genuine disputed material fact exists as to Iverson’s knowledge of the alleged defects.

This decision is unanimous (5-0), with opinion authored by Justice Salter. 

 

This decision may be accessed at

 

http://ujs.sd.gov/Supreme_Court/opinions.aspx .