The SD Supreme Court handed down four decisions this morning:
1) Felonious possession of marijuana as basis for revocation of
commercial driver’s license;
2) Amputation of portion of leg as permanent total disability;
3) Attorney fees denied against farm mutual on bad faith claim;
4) Perils of Contract for Deed; reversal of equitable tolling
doctrine.
Summaries follows:
IBRAHIM v. DEP’T OF PUBLIC SAFETY, 2021 S.D. 17: The SD Dept. of Public Safety revoked
Ibrahim’s commercial driver’s license for one year on the basis of his
possession of a felonious amount of marijuana while use a motor vehicle,
applying SDCL 32-12A-36(4) (“using a . . . vehicle in the commission of any felony. . . .”). The trial court disagreed, interpreting the
statute to require the “vehicle was an
‘instrumentality’ of the felony.” The SD Supreme Court reversed the
trial court and affirmed the revocation.
This decision is unanimous (5-0) with opinion authored by Chief Justice
Jensen.
BILLMAN v. CLARKE MACHINE, INC., 2021 S.D. 18: This 62 year
old employee suffered a work-related injury necessitating the amputation of a
portion of his left leg. The SD DOL and
the trial court denied permanent total disability benefits, “finding him not obviously unemployable and that he failed to
conduct a reasonable job search.” The SD Supreme Court reversed,
finding that DOL’s position was “clearly erroneous.” This decision is unanimous (5-0) with opinion
by Retired Chief Justice Gilbertson.
SENTELL v. FARM MUTUAL INS., 2021 S.D. 19: Insureds brought
suit against property insurer, arising out of damages inflicted by hail and
wind storm and the conduct of insurer in handling their claim. The jury awarded insureds $250,000 on breach
of contract and $150,000 on bad faith claim.
Thereafter, Insureds sought to recovery attorney fees of $498,582.58 on
the basis of SDCL 58-33-46.1 and SDCL 58-12-3.
The Insurer claimed exemption from an attorney fee award under the
express language of SDCL 58-35-57(9) (language addressing the application of other
provisions of the insurance code as relating to farm mutuals) in regard to SDCL
58-12-3 (vexatious or unreasonable refusal to pay). Insurer further asserted that an award of
attorney fees under SDCL 58-33-46.1 could not be used as “as a back door to collect” an award
not permitted under SDCL 58-12-3. The
trial court’s ruling, as described in ¶11:
The [trial]
court rejected Farm Mutual’s first argument that the exemption of farm mutual
insurers from liability for attorney fees under SDCL 58-12-3 precluded an award
of attorney fees under SDCL 58-33- 46.1, noting that the Legislature has
specifically subjected farm mutual insurance companies to the Unfair Trade
Practices Act (the Act). However, the court concluded that it could not award
attorney fees under SDCL 58-33-46.1 because Sentell and Odland did not ask the
jury to determine whether Farm Mutual violated the Act.
The SD Supreme Court Affirmed, stating:
[¶30.]
[Insureds] were ultimately successful here in obtaining a damage award against
Farm Mutual for its breach of contract and bad faith. If they had not been
dealing with an insurer specifically excluded by statute from the provisions in
SDCL 58-12-3, they may have also been able to recover attorney fees under the
procedure outlined in SDCL 58-12-3.1. But the absence of a remedy under SDCL
58-12-3 does not afford [the insureds] an attorney fee remedy under SDCL 58-33-46.1.
Moreover, even if the conduct they alleged could be construed to fall within
the parameters of SDCL 58-33-46.1, [the insureds] failed to submit that factual
issue to the jury. Thus, the circuit court properly declined to award their
requested attorney fees.
This decision is unanimous (5-0) with opinion authored by
Justice DeVaney.
ESTATE OF FRENCH, 2021 S.D. 20: Individual sought enforcement of a contract
for deed for 320 acres against Decedent's Estate. The contract was entered into in 1982. Payment of the entire purchase price was
disputed. It is clear that $65,138.01
was paid, with the Estate claiming a balance of $34,861.99. In regard to the
lateness of the claim, the trial court utilized the "doctrine of equitable tolling" denying
the Estate's request to discharge the contract on the basis of the 15 year
limitations period. The SD Supreme Court reversed and remanded, "with instructions to discharge the contract pursuant to
SDCL 21-51-1.” With
respect to the equitable tolling concept, the Court stated:
[¶20.] At
the outset, the availability of equitable tolling within our common law is not
a forgone conclusion. We have not officially adopted the equitable tolling
doctrine for civil cases, see Anson v. Star Brite Inn Motel, 2010 S.D.
73, ¶ 15 n.2, 788 N.W.2d 822, 825 n.2, and as Justice Konenkamp has noted,
there are serious questions about whether it could be incorporated into our
decisional law, see id. ¶¶ 36-40 (Konenkamp, J., concurring).
Footnote 8 of the opinion also explains:
8. Our disposition here results only in the
discharge of the contract for deed. There is no other question before us, and
we express no opinion as to any other potential remedy concerning the
circumstances of this case.
This decision is unanimous (5-0) with opinion authored by
Justice Salter.
These decisions may be accessed at
http://ujs.sd.gov/Supreme_Court/opinions.aspx .
